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Reporting on a longitudinal case study of the introduction of business planning and 
perfornance measures in cultural organizations, this article uses Weber's identifica- 
tion of types of rationality as a means to illuminate institutional and organizational 
change. The study illustrates how conflict that accompanies change coalesces around 
different dimensions of rationality-substantive, practical, theoretical, and instru- 
mental-that inform organization members' understandings of organizational and 
professional identity and management practices. 
The two germinal articles of neoinstitutional the- 
ory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983/1991); Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977/1991) identify prevailing institution- 
alized, rationalized concepts as a source of formal 
structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991) and see or- 
ganizations as dramatic enactments of rationalized 
myths (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983/1991). Subse- 
quent research has identified the means through 
which rationalized concepts and myths become in- 
corporated into organizations (see Mizruchi & Fein, 
1999), and with what effects, and theorizes factors 
influencing responses to institutional pressures, 
such as the source of institutional requirements 
(Scott, 1995). One area that has not received much 
attention, however, is the nature of the rationalized 
concepts and myths themselves, the institutional 
requirements to which individuals in organizations 
are obliged to respond. In this article, I examine the 
extent to which the nature of a rationalized myth 
facilitates its acceptance or resistance. In doing so, 
I return to Weber, who, as Scott noted, "More con- 
temporary analysts of institutions lay claim to ... 
as their guiding genius than any other early theo- 
rist" (1995: 10). In particular, I use Weber's con- 
cepts of rationality and types of rational action to 
argue that these provide a conceptual framework 
with which to analyze organizational responses to 
rationalized myths. 
The rationalized myth that is examined is the 
role of business planning and performance mea- 
sures that together comprise a strategic perfor- 
mance measurement system (SPMS), a key compo- 
nent of "new public management" (Dunleavy & 
Hood, 1994; Hood, 1995). New public management 
has been a response of many neoliberal economies 
to the crisis in public funding, with variations of it 
having been adopted in New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and federal and other jurisdictions of the 
United States (Gore, 1993; Hood, 1995; Pollitt, 
1993; Pusey, 1991). Business planning and perfor- 
mance measures have been advocated as a central 
strategy for gaining greater control over public ex- 
penditure, increased value for money, and account- 
ability and as a means to demonstrate improved 
managerial competence in the public sector (Os- 
borne & Gaebler, 1993). Both in the literature and 
practice of public sector reform, business planning 
and performance measures have gained the status 
of rationalized, institutionalized myths and have 
been viewed as being a route to better management 
and enhanced accountability, associated as these 
measures are with private sector practices (Hood, 
1998; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). 
The article presents findings from a longitudinal 
case study into the introduction of business plan- 
ning and performance measures in a division of the 
provincial government of Alberta, Canada. Cultural 
Facilities and Historical Resources (CFHR) is a di- 
vision of the Department of Community Develop- 
ment, which has responsibility for a number of 
areas, including the Individual Rights Protection 
Act; parks and recreation; the arts; seniors; and 
cultural facilities. CFHR's mandate is the preserva- 
tion and protection of Alberta's diverse natural, 
historic, and cultural resources. It is responsible for 
The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada and the University of Alberta Faculty of Busi- 
ness Muir Fund have funded this research. I would like 
to thank the editor and three anonymous referees for 
their valuable comments on drafts of this article. Empir- 
ical research was conducted with Professor David Cooper 
of the University of Alberta, whom I would also like to 
thank for his comments. I also sincerely thank the indi- 
viduals from Alberta Community Development who par- 
ticipated in the study. The views expressed here do not 
reflect the views of the department of Canadian govern- 
ment studied here. 
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18 museums, historical and interpretive sites 
within the province, including the Provincial Mu- 
seum and Archives; a UNESCO (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) 
World Heritage Site; a major dinosaur museum; 
and smaller sites that detail the economic history of 
Alberta. CFHR has a budget of approximately $17 
million (Canadian) and a staff of 250. 
I begin by briefly examining Weber's identifica- 
tion of different forms of rationality (substantive, 
theoretical, practical, and instrumental). I then use 
these categories to examine the underlying ratio- 
nalities that informed the work and purpose of 
CFHR and the competing rationalities presented by 
the introduction of business planning and perfor- 
mance measures. Identifying dimensions of ratio- 
nality is used as a heuristic device to illustrate 
which dimensions of rationalized myths encour- 
aged acceptance and which prompted resistance, 
and to disentangle this evolving dynamic. The 
study illustrates how particular dimensions of the 
rationality of business plans and performance mea- 
sures-principally, theoretical and formal rational- 
ity-interact to destabilize the dominant substan- 
tive and practical rationality of museums. 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND RATIONALITY 
The relationship between rationality and institu- 
tional behavior in institutional theory is ambiguous 
(Scott, 1995). In part this ambiguity reflects the 
relationship's roots in Parsons's (1960) distinction 
between the technical, managerial, and institu- 
tional levels of organization. The technical, con- 
cerned with efficient production, subsequently be- 
came elided with the rational. The institutional, or 
societal or environmental interface, focused on is- 
sues of legitimation and meaning (Hirsch, 1997; 
Scott, 1995). Scott (1995) argued that early work in 
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) 
reflects "the view that institutional structures and 
forms were, if not irrational, at least nonrational in 
character" (Scott, 1995: 152). This position was 
subsequently modified. Scott and Meyer (1994) rec- 
ognized that institutional and rational forces were 
often alternative sources of structure and behavior 
but were not necessarily in conflict. In more recent 
institutional theory, institutional forces are seen as 
encompassing and subsuming rational ones; that is, 
there is a recognition that institutional processes 
set rules of rationality (Scott, 1995). 
This later position is in keeping with Weber's 
rationalization thesis, another intellectual influ- 
ence on institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Rationalization, a 
universal historical process involving emancipa- 
tion from tradition, was the focus of Weber's com- 
parative, historical sociological works (Albrow, 
1987; Lash & Whimster, 1987; Weber, 1978). For 
Weber, rationalization leads to the differentiation 
of society into distinct, autonomous, and con- 
stantly colliding spheres of activity-"value 
spheres"-each with its own immanent values, 
norms, and obligations. As such, each value sphere 
has patterns of action and ways of life that are 
defended as "rational," while those of other life 
spheres are labeled "irrational." Value spheres 
have been incorporated into institutional theory 
through Friedland and Alford's (1991) concept of 
institutional logics. The recognition that institu- 
tional environments are pluralistic, with multiple 
legitimate rationalities, however, raises two ques- 
tions. The first question concerns dimensions of 
rationality. If, as Scott remarked, "Institutional 
rules invent rationality" (1995: 140), what are the 
dimensions of rationality that can be discerned 
within institutional rules? The second question re- 
lates to how conflicts among institutional require- 
ments are handled. As Scott noted, "There is no 
question but that many competing and inconsistent 
logics exist in modern society. ... However, the 
presence and extent of such conflicts remain to be 
evaluated empirically" (1995: 130). The question is 
how. 
There have been various attempts within the or- 
ganizational literature to broaden the concept of 
rationality from the dominance of formal, instru- 
mental, purposive, or means-end, rationality. 
March (1981), in his identification of alternatives to 
"willfulness," considered action as matching be- 
havior with position or situation-that is, as fol- 
lowing a criterion of appropriateness rather than 
one of consequential optimality. Drawing upon the 
Aristotelian virtue of phronesis (practical reason; 
Townley, 1999), the logic of appropriateness thus 
encompasses such queries as "What kind of situa- 
tion is this? What kind of person am I? and What is 
appropriate for me in a situation like this?" (March, 
1981: 222). This practical reason is contrasted with 
the logic of instrumentalism. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991a) proffered a similar distinction in contrast- 
ing rational action with practical action. The latter, 
informed by a social constructivist argument, is 
designed to take into account the situation and 
context that guide action and provide the frame- 
work for "reasonable" action. 
Weber proffered different types of social action 
familiar to organizational researchers: affectual 
(based on emotion); traditional (based on habit); 
wertrational, or value-rational (based on values); 
and zweckrational, or means-end rational (based on 
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calculation). As social action is rational to the ex- 
tent to which it is based on ideas and conscious 
choice, Weber categorized the two former types of 
social action as being "borderline of what can jus- 
tifiably be called meaningfully oriented action" 
(Weber, 1978: 25). He considered them types of 
value-rational or means-end rational action when 
they become more reflective or self-conscious. 
Although the contradictory relationship between 
instrumentally rational and value-rational action 
has been recommended as informing understand- 
ings of institutional change (Roth, 1987), identify- 
ing two types of rational action-which have been 
variously framed as instrumental/appropriate, ra- 
tional/practical, and instrumental/value-based- 
does not provide the basis for a well-nuanced 
analysis. Scott (1995), for example, incorporated 
March's logics of instrumentality and appropriate- 
ness in his three "pillars" of institutions. The logic 
of instrumentality is associated with the regulative 
pillar, the logic of appropriateness with the norma- 
tive pillar; however, the cognitive pillar has dimen- 
sions of both. This raises problems for what have 
been presented as analytically and operationally 
distinct pillars (Hirsch, 1997). Equally, to state that 
a sphere is operating within a logic of appropriate- 
ness or displays its own practical action is to do no 
more than state Scott's (1995) original claim that 
institutional rules invent rationality. 
One means of remedying this potential impasse 
is to return to Weber's original emphasis of analyz- 
ing institutional change by analyzing dimensions 
of rationality. Doing this requires a shift in empha- 
sis from the rational action that has been the focus 
of the organizational literature to date, to forms of 
rationality. Weber's identification of discrete types 
of rationality as constituting the cornerstones of 
different types of rationalization processes suggests 
that rationalized myths also have within them dif- 
ferent components of rationality. 
Although rationality has been identified as "the 
major theme" (Kalberg, 1980: 1145), "a central con- 
cern" (Swidler, 1973: 35), and the "idee maitresse" 
(Brubaker, 1984: 1) of Weber's work, its exact 
meaning is confusing. Brubaker (1984), for exam- 
ple, identified 16 different meanings of the term 
"rational." In a detailed analysis of Weber's Econ- 
omy and Society and the Collected Essays in the 
Sociology of Religion, however, Kalberg (1980) 
identified four types of rationality used in Weber's 
work. These are practical (the calculation of the 
most expedient (pragmatic) means of dealing with 
day-to-day difficulties); theoretical (the construc- 
tion of increasingly precise abstract concepts, in- 
volving deduction, attribution of causality, and the 
formation of symbolic meanings); substantive (a 
preference for certain ultimate values); and formal 
(a means-end rational calculation). 
Two types of rationality inform the rational ac- 
tion familiar to organization theorists: substantive 
rationality informs value-rational action, and for- 
mal rationality informs instrumentally rational 
action. Substantive rationality orders action in re- 
lation to a past, present, or potential "value postu- 
late," or cluster of values, where behavior is valued 
for its own sake, independently of its prospects of 
success. Substantive rationalities may vary in their 
degree of comprehensiveness and internal unity 
and may be circumscribed, organizing only a de- 
limited area of life, such as small groups or organi- 
zations, or may be broader, informing institutions, 
cultures, and civilizations (Lash & Whimster, 
1987). Formal rationality informs means-end ratio- 
nal action. A conscious weighing of ends and var- 
ious possible means to these ends, and the probable 
secondary consequences of employing these 
means, guide means-end action. Informed by for- 
mal rationality, action is determined by expecta- 
tions of the behavior of others, humans or objects. 
Theoretical rationality "involves a conscious 
mastery of reality through the construction of in- 
creasingly precise abstract concepts" (Kalberg, 
1980: 1152). It is a cognitive template that informs 
understandings of how the world works and in- 
forms action on this basis. Practical rationality, in 
contrast, guides actions in daily routines, providing 
patterns of action for the expedient means of deal- 
ing with immediate practical difficulties. Its level 
of intellectual articulation remains tacit. 
The value of identifying these different types of 
rationalities is that they are not antithetical, 
thereby forcing an either/or analysis. Rather, all are 
operational within a given societal or value sphere. 
The iron cage of bureaucracy-one dimension of 
rationalization-is, for Weber, saturated by formal, 
theoretical, and practical rationality (Weiss, 1987). 
Dimensions of rationality combine or struggle 
against one another in a tapestry of shifting bal- 
ances. They may coalesce and conflict. This shift- 
ing allows for a dynamic analysis of responses to 
rationalized myths, in which one can trace ele- 
ments of accommodation and resistance over time, 
and for the identification of internal tensions and 
contradictions. Just as for Weber, different social 
strata carry specific rationalization processes; 
equally, different social groups may respond differ- 
ently to the types of rationality inherent within 
rationalized myths. Sources of "irrationality" may 
be varied within the same rationalized myth, de- 
pending on the social group that is responding. 
Rather than suggesting a unidimensional process of 
success or failure, this opens up the possibilities of 
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conflicting developments and reversals, with dif- 
ferent dimensions of rationality being more readily 
acceded to than others. 
The study investigates how one particular value 
sphere, cultural facilities and museums, with its 
discrete type of substantive, theoretical, practical, 
and formal rationality, responded to the different 
understandings of those rationalities "carried" 
through the practices of business planning and per- 
formance measures. 
METHODS 
Responses to institutional pressures over time 
require careful case study research (Barley, 1986). 
This research began in 1994, following the an- 
nouncement that business planning and perfor- 
mance measures were to be introduced into govern- 
ment departments, but prior to their development 
in Alberta's Cultural Facilities and Historical Re- 
sources, and it is ongoing. Its focus has been to 
trace a political initiative as it has been articulated 
and developed and to discover its impact on man- 
agerial practice (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998). 
The case draws upon empirical material from ex- 
tended semistructured interviews with those who 
were most closely responsible for the introduction 
and implementation of these mechanisms, usually 
lasting between one and a half to two and a half 
hours. All interviews were recorded and tran- 
scribed. 
Interviews with six representatives from the cen- 
tral government and from the auditor general's of- 
fice, both of which were associated with promoting 
and developing business planning and perfor- 
mance measures, have been undertaken every year 
since 1994. Each representative was asked about 
the rationales, espoused and understood, for the 
introduction of business plans and performance 
measures and what it was hoped they would 
achieve. The interviewees were also asked how 
they specifically tried to develop public sector 
business plans and measures; what guided the de- 
sign of templates for civil servants; particular diffi- 
culties that had been encountered; and responses to 
these initiatives. Interviews were supplemented by 
attendance at workshops or seminars that intro- 
duced "reinventing government" to public sector 
managers. Researchers also attended the Govern- 
ment Interchange Programme, a forum for minis- 
ters, deputy ministers, and senior civil servants 
organized at the University of Alberta to discuss 
experiences of devising and introducing perfor- 
mance measures in various government depart- 
ments. At the department level, interviews were 
held every year with six senior managers having 
primary responsibility for the development, design, 
and introduction of department business plans and 
performance measures. In addition, meetings, which 
had a specific remit for the construction and imple- 
mentation of departmental performance measures 
and business plans, developing the department's an- 
nual report, and submissions to the government's per- 
formance measures, were also observed between 
1994 and 1996. These observations were also supple- 
mented by attendance at meetings that were held for 
all department managers introducing and explaining 
this new method of managing. 
Contact at the division and the site level was 
more frequent and more comprehensive. At CFHR, 
the researchers held interviews with six senior 
managers twice a year in order to understand the 
developments that were taking place at the division 
and site levels. We also interviewed historians, cu- 
rators, archivists, and researchers involved in de- 
veloping site exhibits in order to understand the 
impact of these changes on their work. Divisional 
meetings relating to the implementation of busi- 
ness planning and performance measures were also 
attended. At the site level, managers responsible for 
the day-to-day operation of a site, curators, educa- 
tors, researchers, and representatives of the sites' 
"friends" organizations were interviewed in annual 
visits to smaller sites and biannual visits to the 
larger ones. Interviewees were asked about their 
responses to the introduction and implementation 
of business planning and performance measures 
and their experiences of working with them. The 
specific purpose was to get perceptions, observa- 
tions, and thoughts about the relevance of business 
planning and performance measures for managing 
cultural institutions and to understand how oper- 
ating managers made sense of them. In particular, 
the aim was to see how an initiative that was nom- 
inally introduced with the rationale that it should 
help managers manage better had been integrated 
into everyday activities and managers' "sense- 
making" activities (Weick, 1995). 
Archival material collected at all four levels of 
government supplemented interviews. Official gov- 
ernment publications from the cabinet and auditor 
general's office were collected as well as party po- 
litical documents and government documents 
explaining these changes to Albertans. At the de- 
partment, division, and site levels, documents 
examined included the business plans that were 
developed for each level and their reported perfor- 
mance measures, division and department annual 
reports, and department accountability reports. 
Thus, for each level of the research, data have 
been collected over six years. For this article, 
which is part of a larger study, the collected mate- 
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rials and the transcribed interview materials were 
worked through iteratively (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). They were examined for what they revealed 
of respondents' understandings of the purpose and 
role of museums and cultural facilities (the sub- 
stantive and instrumental rationality of museums) 
and of how they understood their day-to-day activ- 
ities as they engaged in designing exhibits and pre- 
paring special events (their theoretical and practi- 
cal rationality). Interviews and documentary 
evidence were also examined for the rationale for 
the introduction of business planning and perfor- 
mance measures (its substantive rationality) and for 
the understanding of how these practices were de- 
signed to enhance or improve organizational func- 
tioning (theoretical, practical, and formal rational- 
ity). Through an examination of responses in terms 
of substantive, theoretical, practical, and formal ra- 
tionality, it was possible to come to an understand- 
ing of how this particular conceptual framework 
could shed light on making sense of the explana- 
tions that were offered by the research participants. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WITHIN 
CULTURAL FACILITIES 
The Underlying Rationalities of CFHR 
CFHR is involved in cultural resources manage- 
ment (the preservation and protection of artifacts 
and archival records) and in facility management 
(the presentation of educational programs and ex- 
hibits at provincially operated sites). One of its 
chief areas of responsibility is the management of 
18 museums and interpretive centers in the prov- 
ince. These vary in size and importance, from the 
larger curatorial museums, having several dozen 
staff members and budgets from $1.5 to $3 million 
(Canadian) to smaller sites that have six to a dozen 
staff members, with budgets of $250-500 thousand. 
Staff at the larger sites include professionals, such 
as curators and archivists, who have their own 
professional bodies, as well as nonprofessionals, 
including educators, researchers, interpreters, ex- 
hibit coordinators, designers, and technicians. 
Smaller sites may only have a site manager with an 
interpreter and educator. Site managers vary in 
background but usually have professional (usually 
curatorial), or professional museum training, or 
many years' experience within CFHR. Only three 
site managers have no experience with museums 
and cultural facilities, having recently transferred 
from outside the division. 
CFHR's responsibility for a relatively discrete 
area of government operations and its experience of 
limited personnel turnover has resulted in the de- 
velopment of an interpretive community (Bar- 
tunek, 1984), with a strong sense of organizational 
identity at the division and site levels. The ratio- 
nalities that underlie this identity are presented 
separately, to illustrate their value as a heuristic 
device, although in practice they intertwine and 
overlap. 
Substantive rationality. Museums are a differen- 
tiated, autonomous value sphere, guided by their 
own axiological and normative autonomy. A site or 
museum has traditionally had a social value or 
worthiness in itself, supported by the substantive 
end or value of heritage preservation (Karp, 1992; 
Weil, 1990). The dominant purpose that informed 
the management of museums and historical sites 
for a large part of the 20th century, encapsulated in 
this statement from the National Museums of Can- 
ada, was as follows: "Museums collect, they pre- 
serve and study what they collect and they share 
both the collections and the knowledge derived 
therefrom for the instruction and self-enlighten- 
ment of an audience" (Weil, 1990: 45). It is this 
worth or value-preservation, interpretation, and 
discovery-that has traditionally determined a mu- 
seum's organizational identity, defining its central 
character and its distinctiveness (Albert & Whetten, 
1985). These underlying values have also tradition- 
ally underpinned organizational structures and 
systems; informed the working identities, focus, 
and purpose of curators, researchers, interpreters, 
historians, archivists, and educators; and deter- 
mined work practices and their evaluation (Oakes 
et al., 1998). Those working at the division and site 
CFHR levels reflected this broader institutionalized 
understanding of museums, seeing their mandate 
(referred to by several as a "mantra") as being to 
"preserve, protect and present." 
Theoretical rationality. As with many profes- 
sionally based organizations, the corpus of knowl- 
edge that informs action at CFHR remains largely 
tacit. The work in museums and historical sites 
remains largely uncodified, and it is based on am- 
biguous technologies whose outputs are difficult to 
appraise (Oakes et al., 1988). The CFHR relies on 
the logic of confidence and good faith and assumes 
public trust and confidence in outputs-"I mean, 
you are supposed to depend, that, when you come 
to us, what we tell you is true, or as true as infor- 
mation is" (museum professional, 1994 interview).' 
' 
"Museum professional" is not restricted to archivists 
or curators or those with professional designations but 
refers to all personnel at the site and division levels who 
were responsible for the exhibits and substantive content 
of museums and cultural facilities; thus, the term in- 
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The activity of both professional and nonprofes- 
sional museum staff may best be characterized as 
being a "practice" "a coherent and complex form 
of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that activity are 
realized" (Maclntyre, 1984: 187). Members of a 
practice aspire to established standards of excel- 
lence and reflect a social and intellectual tradition 
in their actions. A practice requires a certain kind 
of relationship between those who participate in it 
and those who have participated in it, with the 
recognition that individuals inherit a particular 
space within an interlocking set of social relation- 
ships, and membership of a social group that gives 
obligations and duties. This sense of working 
within a tradition, or belonging to a practice, is 
reflected in the way museum staff members talk 
about their work. "But the activity of a museum ... 
you will never get to the end of it. It is not like it is 
in a lot of other places. The immediate results are 
not immediately forthcoming. It might be several 
years down the line. And for a lot of people ... you 
couldn't work in that kind of situation" (site man- 
ager, 1994). 
Practical rationality. Action in a practice is 
guided by practical reason (Townley, 1999). Prac- 
tical reason cannot be exercised apart from mem- 
bership of a particular group. Action is informed by 
the "goods" at stake, or the value of the sphere-the 
authenticity of the artifact, the accuracy of the ex- 
hibit-and reasoning is in relation to the tradition. 
A practice is exercised without regard for conse- 
quences. It is action that furthers the values embod- 
ied in the tradition. In this it is akin to March's 
(1981) logic of appropriateness, or what Meyer 
(1994) termed "action responsibility," and it is this 
practical and substantive rationality that informs 
the practice of museum staff. 
Formal rationality. Although heavily informed 
by a practical-ethical rationality, museums func- 
tion within broader social contexts, and this in- 
forms their actions. Changes in public funding have 
prompted museums to try to justify their value, to 
establish a value beyond being custodians of heri- 
tage. Most of Alberta's museums were established 
in the 1980s or early 1990s. By this time, Weil 
(1990) suggested, new museums generally were not 
simply advocated as sites for collections, preserva- 
tion, and interpretation; they were also described 
as tourist sites and sources of local economic 
growth. The CFHR followed this logic and justified 
the opening of new sites on economic grounds. 
However, managers were very conscious that it was 
a political strategy to use economic logic to main- 
tain the core activity of preservation and education. 
Secondary benefits (consequences) would be used 
to sustain the core (the practice). As part of sustain- 
ing this rationale, CFHR kept statistics on the eco- 
nomic impact of sites that were later incorporated 
into the performance measure system. 
The Introduction of Business Planning and 
Performance Measures 
In 1993, the recently elected Progressive Conser- 
vative government of Alberta, led by Premier Ralph 
Klein, announced a series of initiatives indicating a 
different approach to government. Driven by the 
promise to reduce the provincial deficit and "rein- 
vent government," the government announced that 
all departments would develop three-year business 
plans. Departments began developing business 
plans in 1993-94. In May 1994, it was announced 
that the departments were to develop key perfor- 
mance measures. In May 1995, the Government 
Accountability Act obliged departments to submit 
annual reports on their business plans, goals, and 
performance measures, with a comparison of actual 
and desired results for each of their identified key 
areas. In June 1995, Measuring Up, described as the 
first annual report of government, was published. It 
listed 22 core measures of government and a 
"watch list" of 47 other measures with which it 
proposed government performance should be eval- 
uated. This document has been produced annually 
since. Owing to these changes, departments now 
produce business plans reporting on their objec- 
tives and performance measures, annual reports 
reporting their achievements, and annual perfor- 
mance measures for Measuring Up. Divisions pro- 
duce business plans, annual reports, and reports on 
measures. Sites also produce business plans and 
report their performance measures. In 1998, it was 
announced that business plans and performance 
measures had to be developed for every operating 
unit and that from 1999 on, individuals would have 
to develop their own plans and performance mea- 
sures, indicating how these fit into unit, site, divi- 
sion, and department plans. 
The core business of the CFHR was defined as 
preserving, protecting, and presenting Alberta's 
unique cultural and natural history. This project 
had two dimensions: heritage resource preserva- 
tion and education. The desired outcome for the 
former is the preservation of Alberta's cultural and 
historic resources and involves working with com- 
munities to preserve their heritage resources. For 
cludes educators, researchers, interpreters, exhibit de- 
signers, and coordinators. This broad definition is used 
to protect the confidentiality of respondents. 
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the latter, the desired outcome is "knowledge 
about, access to and appreciation for the province's 
rich natural and cultural heritage by the people of 
Alberta and visitors to the province," according to 
Community Development business plans for 1994- 
97. The performance measures that were eventually 
adopted by CFHR were the number of persons vis- 
iting provincial historical sites and museums; the 
percentage of visitors to provincial historic sites 
and museums who rated their overall experience at 
above average or excellent; and the percentage of 
visitors to provincial historic sites and museums 
who rated their learning experience at above 
average or excellent (Community Development 
1996-99 business plans). These measures were 
subsequently expanded. A further goal was to in- 
crease the economic impact of historical resources 
and cultural facilities on local, regional, and pro- 
vincial economies. The rationale for measuring 
economic impact was that it would indicate the 
importance placed by citizens of and visitors to the 
province on the preservation of those resources, 
as Community Development's 1996 annual report 
stated. 
Business planning and performance measures 
also carry their own dimensions of rationality, as is 
expanded below. 
Substantive rationality. Moves to a strategic per- 
formance measurement system reflect a dissatisfac- 
tion with pluralistic or interest group politics and 
are an attempt to replace the rationality of politics 
with the rationality of planning (Carter, Klein, & 
Day, 1992). They promise a better, more rational 
social order and the substitution of rational justifi- 
cation for politics in the public realm. Business 
planning and performance measures carry with 
them the substantive rationality and legitimized 
myths of efficiency, value for money, improved 
management competence and increased manage- 
ment accountability, and greater control over pub- 
lic expenditure and, through this, an enhanced le- 
gitimacy for government. As such, these measures 
reflect a faith in managerial rationalism that has 
characterized public sector initiatives for the last 
50 years (Carter et al., 1995). Business planning and 
performance measures also represent an extension 
of private sector methods into public and not-for- 
profit sectors. This extension carries with it a dom- 
inant legitimized myth in which the private sector 
is associated with efficiency and value for money. 
The latter was especially appealing to the Progres- 
sive Conservative Party in Alberta, whose advent to 
power was premised on the more efficient manage- 
ment of government (Lisac, 1995). In Alberta, using 
business plans and performance measures was con- 
sidered to be conceptually different from previous 
methods of government accountability and evalua- 
tion: a move from a bureaucratic, input-based gov- 
ernment system to a decentralized, empowered, 
outcome-oriented government. The government's 
first business plan, released in January 1994, stated 
this: 
By setting benchmarks and targets and measuring 
progress against high standards and expectations, 
we can evaluate our achievements, provide reliable 
information to Albertans, and focus our efforts and 
resources to strategies and programs where we get 
the best results. 
Theoretical rationality. In addition to offering a 
substantive rationality of "better" government, a 
strategic performance measurement system is also a 
clear statement of a theoretical rationality. Support 
for business planning and performance measures 
stems from the belief that success (high perfor- 
mance) derives from rational systems (Jackson, 
1988). Rationalized work makes the connection be- 
tween means and ends, cause and effect, relatively 
transparent. Such transparency entails setting clear 
objectives and goals; designing strategies and allo- 
cating resources to achieve objectives and goals; 
measuring performance and results in terms of 
outputs achieved; and evaluating the outcomes of 
action. In Alberta, each operating entity, through 
departments, divisions, units, and programs to in- 
dividuals, was to be held accountable for results 
achieved relative to government plans and desired 
outcomes. Business planning and performance 
measures were thus consciously conceived as form- 
ing a tiered relationship, the final result being the 
creation of an articulated and integrated matrix or 
map that would combine all the disparate ele- 
ments. The 1997 guidelines for business planning 
and performance measures promulgated by the Of- 
fice of the Auditor General stated that: 
All organizations are to prepare plans and perfor- 
mance reports, and that plans should state results to 
be achieved, actions to be taken, by whom, and 
estimated costs and performance targets; expected 
results need to be clearly expressed and must be 
measurable and performance reports should com- 
pare actual to planned results; accountability re- 
ports should also link information on the costs of 
outputs with information on their effects. 
Performance information at every level would 
compare actual with planned results. Evaluating 
results would provide information to determine 
what needed to be changed, how changes should be 
made, and how results could be improved. 
In making processes and consequences unambig- 
uous and establishing clear relationships between 
inputs and outputs, monetary expenditure and ac- 
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complishments, a rational organization is also a 
statement of causal analysis (Meyer, 1992). The 
construction of precise, abstract concepts of goals, 
objectives, measures, and so forth, elaborated in 
means-end chains and causal relationships, is pre- 
mised on a view of how the world functions. It is 
rooted in analysis, with the whole being equal to 
the sum of the parts (Carley, 1988). The clear rela- 
tionship between inputs and outcomes has within 
it an implicit linear causal progression. "The whole 
organization is depicted as a much simplified 
means-end chain with inputs marching inevitably 
along through procedures to benefits" (Meyer, 
1983: 235). Measurement is transparent, a reflec- 
tion of that which is observed. "Force" is required 
for change or development, either in the form of an 
incentive or threat, with negative feedback leading 
to adaptation, equilibrium, and stability. This the- 
oretical model is designed to inform practice. 
Formal rationality. In addition to carrying sub- 
stantive and theoretical rationalities, business 
planning and performance measures also carry an 
implicit formal rationality. They emphasize out- 
comes, the consequences of actions-not the pro- 
cess itself, but its result. A senior department man- 
ager stressed this point as he explained the new 
model of management: 
We can demonstrate generally that we have deliv- 
ered what we said we were going to deliver in terms 
of programs, i.e., that grants got out the door. OK. 
But that is nothing new. That is the old model of 
assessing performance and the Treasury is saying 
that that is not good enough anymore. "We want to 
measure your outcomes. We want to measure if the 
people are satisfied with what you are doing, or if 
they really need what you are doing." And so that is 
driving everything in terms of development of mea- 
sures and indicators. (Department manager, 1994 
interview) 
Business planning and performance measures 
are also associated with private sector organiza- 
tions. This association carries implications of an 
incipient commercialization (Forsell & Jansson, 
1996). Implicit in commercialization is that some- 
thing does not have value in itself; value is realized 
through an economic exchange. Business plans and 
performance measures implicitly valorize ex- 
change value as opposed to use value. 
RESPONSES TO COMPETING RATIONALITIES 
Responses to the. introduction of formalized per- 
formance measures are, again, presented below as 
though each rationality is ontologically discrete. 
The value of this presentation is that it allows iden- 
tification of the aspects of rationalized myths that 
are more easily accommodated and acquiesced to 
and of those that prompt resistance. 
Competing Substantive Rationalities 
The introduction of business planning and per- 
formance measures represented a considerable 
change to established methods of managing cul- 
tural facilities. Museum professionals outside the 
province strongly resisted the idea. As a division 
manager reported in a 1994 interview, about re- 
sponse to his request for general information on the 
use of performance indicators in museums: 
[There was a] violent reaction from some museum 
[professionals] who see any attempt to do perfor- 
mance measures and benchmarking as heresy.... It 
is almost as if you precipitated a riot. They do not 
believe that this is appropriate in a cultural institu- 
tion. X [a museum professional] was almost apo- 
plectic over the very thought. I was thoroughly lec- 
tured on it. "We're not measuring the types of 
urinals, you know, we are for doing something 
meaningful at the institution." (Division manager, 
1994) 
As this response illustrates, strong emotional re- 
actions are elicited when the taken-for-granted sub- 
stantive rationality that informs the identity of cul- 
tural institutions, their appropriateness, or moral 
legitimacy, is questioned. 
Within the province, responses were more muted 
because, as one division manager explained in a 
1996 interview, "People in this organization were 
part of the Alberta that created the Klein revolution 
in the first place." There was the belief that the 
government's commitment to three-year business 
planning would aid longer-term organizational 
planning and that performance measures would 
guide organizational decision making and clarify 
purposes. There was initial enthusiasm for devel- 
oping indicators: 
We need to move from efficiency and effectiveness 
numbers and measures. Do we affect knowledge 
bases, people's awareness of their own history? 
What indicators do we use? Cultural impact? Edu- 
cational patterns? Heritage appreciation? We want 
to be in a position of how to make decisions. How do 
we allocate resources based on impact? (Division 
manager, 1995) 
Although there were complaints about the speed 
of the changes the government required, the sub- 
stantive rationality of government accountability, 
efficiency, and informed planning was endorsed. 
This endorsement, however, did not connote the 
acceptance of the private sector model. Respon- 
dents made a strong distinction between being a 
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"business" and being "businesslike": "My first re- 
sponse was, darn ... I've got to think businesslike. 
Except that that is not true. I hope that I have been 
running this in a very businesslike manner before" 
(division manager, 1994). Thus, although being 
businesslike was accepted, there was a strong reac- 
tion against being a business. 
Although the substantive rationalities of Alber- 
ta's Cultural Facilities and Historical Resources 
and a strategic performance measure system appear 
conflictual, in practice there was little disagree- 
ment over these areas. The legitimacy of the gov- 
ernment's appeal for increased accountability, 
value for money, and efficiency was never ques- 
tioned by those in CFHR. The latter were equally 
concerned about being accountable, offering value 
for money, and being efficient and had always con- 
sidered themselves as having been so. Accountabil- 
ity has such a broad degree of social institutional- 
ization and legitimacy that it subsumes any 
differences that might arise between value spheres 
operating on different logics. Potential second- 
order areas of disagreement-that is, what was 
meant by being accountable, to whom and for what, 
only became apparent in the practical application 
of performance measures. 
Competing Theoretical and Practical 
Rationalities 
After an initial acceptance of the need for change, 
there was increasing resistance to the incorporation 
of business planning and performance measures in 
practice. This resistance largely focused on a per- 
ceived discrepancy between the underlying theo- 
retical and practical rationalities of cultural facili- 
ties and a strategic performance management 
system. Opposition focused on three theoretical as- 
sumptions that underlay the strategic performance 
management system: that discrete units and con- 
trollable, discrete unit outputs are identifiable; that 
measures are meaningful and reflect key organiza- 
tional aspects; and that measures are transparent. 
Identifying units with discrete outputs. Many 
sites did not have dedicated professional staffs, 
who tended to be a divisional resource, which 
raised difficulties in identifying the sites as discrete 
units: 
If we don't do our jobs well, the sites probably, in 
the long run, are not able to be as effective in terms 
of generating revenue, and bringing people in at the 
door. Our relationship with that is indirect, rather 
than direct.... We need to be here for other groups, 
for other departments to reach their performance 
measures. (Museum professional, 1997) 
Reference was made to the integrated nature of 
work organizations within the division, which 
had been keen to develop a matrix style of oper- 
ation, where curators and historians worked with 
planners, designers, interpreters, educators, and 
so forth. This situation made it difficult to iden- 
tify specific "outputs" and a direct relationship 
between work groups and outcomes. Given the 
integrated nature of work in the division, the 
view was that "there are very few parts of the 
organization that can operate completely wholly 
and on their own. It's very difficult to set up 
performance measures that don't have implica- 
tions for everybody" (museum professional, 
1995). Identifying units and outcomes at the di- 
vision level was not considered to be politically 
acceptable because it did not meet government 
requirements of identifying outcomes from the 
lowest unit level and how these outcomes con- 
tributed to overall performance. 
Where measures were identified, problems were 
encountered with the degree of outcomes' control- 
lability. For example, visitation figures were influ- 
enced by a number of factors, such as weather and 
exchange rates, over which the sites had no control: 
"What is more frustrating is that we only had lim- 
ited control over the indicators chosen, for exam- 
ple, visitation. We were told to improve indicators 
and measures without a concern with underlying 
reality" (division manager, 1996). 
There were also difficulties in trying to produce 
meaningful, aggregate measures. For example, the 
department was divided into cost centers, which 
raised problems in trying to develop reportable ag- 
gregate performance measures: "There is a consid- 
erable debate about whether you can roll up the 
measures and indicators all the way up to the 
higher cost centers and report anything meaningful 
to our political masters. And you can appreciate in 
a department that covers as many policy and issue 
areas as this department, it is virtually impossible 
for us to develop a single set of measures that speak 
meaningfully to anything." Political expediency 
carried the day: 
The deputy has a predisposition toward rolling 
things up. He likes analysis to sort of cascade up or 
cascade down and so one of the initial tasks that he 
gave me was "reduce it to a single number." If one 
part of the department has an overall efficiency rat- 
ing of 2, and another part has an overall efficiency 
rating of 15, saying that we have a 10, is a meaning- 
less number. But, if he wants a single number, he 
indeed will get a single number. (Department man- 
ager, 1995) 
Identifying meaningful measures. One major 
concern was the tendency of performance measures 
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to identify the most visible or easily counted as- 
pects of an organization: "It's a lot easier to see 
things which are kind of on the surface of things 
that seem 'objective' and 'useful' and so on ... 
attendance . . . revenue" (division manager, 1995). 
Concern was expressed that measures of this kind 
tended to underplay other areas of the division, 
such as the role for research. The value of the type 
of measures that were identified was also ques- 
tioned. Visitor satisfaction surveys, for example, 
were thought problematic: "I mean, do you really 
want to interview people, you know, at exit inter- 
views after they've just been to a facility. Is it really 
meaningful? I mean who, after just spending three 
hours at a museum, is going to come up and say 
they learned nothing? You know, maybe it might be 
a lot more meaningful to go back and ask people 
two years after they visited the place" (museum 
professional, 1997). The information was also seen 
as having very limited value: "When you visit the 
site yourself, you want to see what it's doing, and 
how it's working. I go out to sites and follow people 
about, and see what ... and try and see what 
they're saying because . .. I mean . .. I'm interested 
in the content of the sites" (museum professional, 
1998). The mixed metaphor ("seeing" something 
that is said) indicates the importance, and the dif- 
ficulty, of articulating a tacit process, of how a 
concrete and embodied experience, rather than an 
abstracted number, gives valuable or meaningful 
information. 
For museum staff, measurement had to help 
achieve the purpose of the cultural facility. In other 
words, it had to be directed by practical reason: 
"One area that I want to look at is the knowledge 
change of a participant. I don't know how one 
would measure that, but it is important to think 
that if [we are] in a historical business and we want 
to share or interpret the history in a meaningful 
way to the visitor, that there is some either greater 
appreciation of a point of history, or that there is an 
increase in knowledge of fact, of history is being 
accomplished" (site manager, 1996). 
Devising a measure for what was seen as a central 
area of the division, preservation, was particularly 
problematic, especially for curators, for whom 
preservation did not just refer to the artifacts but 
also included "the information that went with the 
artifact, the data, and also from a bit of wider focus, 
the lifeways" (museum professional, 1998). For 
measures to have meaning they had to be part of a 
practice: 
I think the biggest fear is that the performance mea- 
sure has some meaning, like it not just be an arbi- 
trary number or figure, that it actually does refer to 
something that has meaning. So, I think there's the 
main concern ... is that the measurements have 
meaning in the real world, like real meaning some- 
how. Like annual growth of the collections. So 
what? I mean, you can collect an awful lot of ants, 
and so that your collections grow quite amazingly. 
But, so what? I mean, what is that saying? ... But so 
much of this reads like just collecting numbers to 
make you look good without really giving too much 
thought to the meaning of the figures. Because fig- 
ures can mean different things. And if you're out 
there to show that you're progressing extremely 
well, sure, collections growth. But, so what? I mean, 
what good is collections growth if your collections 
are deteriorating in a warehouse somewhere that 
doesn't have any controls? (Museum professional, 
1997) 
Other questions were raised about the conflict- 
ed status of knowledge, between practice-based 
knowledge and performance measures, which have 
an aura of scientific respectability: "I mean, people 
have gut feelings about what works and what 
doesn't work. When it comes to exhibits, for exam- 
ple, it's a number of people who've been involved 
in them, you know, will sit down and tell you what 
works and what doesn't work. So, how do we know 
this? Well ... it's ... you know ... it's personal 
perception. It's observation. It's feedback you get 
from the public. It's a whole series of other things" 
(museum professional, 1997). This museum profes- 
sional then continued: 
I don't think that there's anything, you know, kind 
of bad or worrisome, or whatever, about perfor- 
mance measures. I think, actually, it's a really useful 
thing. I think it is a kind of a useful adjunct to that 
kind of informal conjecture that people formerly 
engaged in. If I do have a worry, I suspect people, 
you know, because of the fascination we have with 
things that have the appearance of being scientific, 
verifiable, etc.... You know ... that's sort of a ... 
the hierarchy of value we place on knowledge 
which really is related to the method by which this 
knowledge is acquired rather than the nature of the 
knowledge itself. 
Transparent measures. There was also a denial 
that performance measures were "transparent," 
that they merely reported an aspect of the organi- 
zation. There was a strong belief that the act of 
reporting a number as a measure changed its na- 
ture. For example, an archivist explained the types 
of measures that would normally be kept. These 
included the extent to which records in a depart- 
ment had been scheduled as compared to what 
records were extant; the number of collections that 
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were accessioned2 as compared with the number of 
collections that were extant to be selected and ac- 
cessioned; and the number of government requests 
for information that were fielded and satisfactorily 
completed (as opposed to not completed). Record- 
ing this information, however, was not new; inter- 
viewees said: "This is what we've always done." 
However, formally recording this information was 
seen as something different. It now became identi- 
fied as the activity of "performance measurement." 
A 1997 interview in which a museum professional 
was asked to describe the difference between the 
former and present practices went as follows: 
Q: So, you wouldn't have recorded the numbers be- 
fore? 
A: We did, yes. 
Q: So what's the difference? 
A: Well, now they're described. Before we just in- 
cluded these statistics in our annual report. 
This respondent saw an ontological difference 
between statistics and measures, even though they 
had the same referent. Measures, in other words, 
were not stable. The act of reporting numbers as 
measures significantly changed their meaning for 
individuals. Whereas measures such as attendance 
and satisfaction might be used to inform the exer- 
cise of the practice-that is, to inform interpreters 
and curators of the response to an exhibit and guide 
future action-"performance measures" signified 
reporting to higher authorities according to exter- 
nalized and formalized criteria. From there, they 
might be put to a number of uses, unconstrained as 
they were by practice. 
It was at the level of theoretical and practical 
rationality that some of the implicit tensions in 
substantive rationality were played out. While ac- 
cepting the legitimacy of broader rationalized 
myths of accountability, CFHR staff experienced 
considerable disagreement over the means by 
which this was to be achieved. Throughout the 
period, clashes over the implicit theoretical and 
practical rationalities of CFHR and strategic perfor- 
mance measurement systems occurred and did not 
diminish over time. Conflict arose over different 
issues and among different groups of actors, at the 
department, division, and site levels, as different 
actors were faced with the need to develop plans 
and measures, identify units, and compartmental- 
ize activity. When issues had been resolved at the 
department level through the political expediency 
of meeting deadlines, they were raised at the divi- 
sion level and then at the site and, finally, at the 
unit and individual levels, which disrupted tempo- 
rary accommodations achieved elsewhere. As cer- 
tain elements became routinized, in that measures 
had been selected and were reported on, discussing 
modifications or developing new measures-for ex- 
ample, preservation measures-raised theoretical 
and practical difficulties once more. Managers, be- 
cause of their museum backgrounds, were as con- 
cerned as other staff. They saw serious practical 
difficulties in developing measures, but they were 
more cognizant of the political need to develop 
them. 
Actors developed different responses to these 
conflicts. Many were pragmatic. Templates were 
developed for reporting, and underlying tensions 
*and ambiguities were ignored in the pressure to 
achieve deadlines and cope with work levels. Some 
were resistant to the use of measures, seeing them 
as abstractions from either holistic or professional 
understandings of museum practice. Others "rein- 
terpreted" measures as being no different from 
what had traditionally been practiced in CFHR. 
Generally, the greater scientific legitimacy of mea- 
sures, with their appeal to "objectivity," had little 
purchase among museum staff. There was, how- 
ever, a strong concern about the possible use that 
might be made of measures and a perception that, 
once recorded, figures took on a "life of their own." 
The overall image is that of responses to theoret- 
ical and practical rationality taking on the features 
of a guerilla war, with the continual, but unpredict- 
able, outbreak of hostilities in different parts of the 
organization, sparked by different issues. Some 
clashes were in the nature of skirmishes; others 
were of greater weight. All led to temporary accom- 
modations, usually made because reports had to be 
produced for higher levels of government, that held 
until the next outbreak, which usually arose when 
CFHR staff faced situations that required revisiting 
existing truces. 
Competing Formal Rationalities 
There was recognition in the division that chang- 
ing economic and political circumstances, particu- 
larly, substantial budget cuts, meant that public 
support and investment in cultural facilities would 
have to be supplemented by revenue generation. 
Revenue generation was recognized as important, 
but there was a concern that it would become a 
focus, to the exclusion of other areas and, in par- 
ticular, that sites would be evaluated on their en- 
tertainment value and the acceptability of their 
2 "Accession" is a curatorial word that means to offi- 
cially receive into a collection, ensuring an artifact has 
all the necessary documentation. 
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messages. Fundamentally, the concern was that 
evaluation would be in terms of consequences- 
visitation, revenue-that would threaten the value 
or worthiness of an institution. 
The economic impact measure generated strong 
concern. Although previously, the department had 
initiated the measure with the explicit intention of 
justifying investment in capital projects, it had now 
become one of a number of annual reporting mea- 
sures for the division. Concern was expressed that, 
once specified and articulated, performance mea- 
sures-visitation, revenue, and economic impact- 
would be internalized and function to regulate con- 
duct, monitor performance, and thus subtly recodify 
purpose. Measures were seen as leading to a kind of 
tunnel vision (Smith, 1993). As one division manager 
complained in 1997: "The issue is that satisfying the 
reality of numbers overwhelms everything else." Oth- 
ers expressed concern that the public service element 
of museums would be lost: 
I don't think we should make performance measures 
the be-all and end-all. . . Because if, in fact, at the 
end of the day, all that really matters is these things 
like revenue and attendance and so on, then there 
are a whole lot of things that we do, we shouldn't be 
doing. We'll never get as many people as Epcott. We 
should never put money or facilities in places with- 
out a big population base. (Museum professional, 
1998) 
The redefinition of activity towards conse- 
quences raised important moral questions for those 
involved: 
There is certainly a concern internally about main- 
taining historic integrity. I mean we are a mission- 
driven organization but we are now having to [be] 
market-driven. If there is a continuum ... if there is 
mission and market ... people would prefer us 
closer to mission. We are concerned about historical 
integrity and the validity of the message. I mean, 
how far do you go before you start threatening the 
message? (Division manager, 1996) 
Given the practical and substantive rationality of 
museums, there was resistance to the formal ratio- 
nality of a means-end calculation, where purpose 
has to be evaluated in terms of results rather than 
value in itself. This resistance is exemplified by the 
1995 comment of one division manager: "I won't 
measure excellence in terms of people through the 
door. If we give them what they want, we give them 
the US west." The fear was that in order to attract 
more visitors the story would have to change and 
that western Canadian history would have to reflect 
popular expectations based on western movie tra- 
ditions. This comment highlights the tension be- 
tween excellence in relation to the standards of 
tradition, versus success in terms of consequence- 
people coming through the door (Maclntyre, 1984). 
For museum staff, the danger lay in patterns of 
formal rationality becoming embedded in organiza- 
tional practice, as a concern for consequences im- 
pinged on, or second-guessed, practical reason. For 
example, one interpretive center that is part of Al- 
berta's CFHR outlines the early history of the fur 
trade in Canada, documenting the history of early 
European settlers and their relationship with the 
native community centered on the trading of fur 
pelts. This has traditionally been portrayed as es- 
sentially a male history-native male hunters trad- 
ing with male European settlers. Wanting to be 
more inclusive, the center wished to put on an 
exhibit entitled "The Country Wife," which docu- 
mented the role that native women played in the 
trading relationship. The women acted as interme- 
diaries between European and native communities. 
European settlers entered into marriages with na- 
tive women, and it was through these relationships 
that they were able to establish trading relation- 
ships with the hunters. Such a story not only gives 
voice to women and their role in an incipient econ- 
omy; it also has implications for the construction of 
sexual identities. The presentation of such a story- 
line in a particularly conservative area when rais- 
ing visitation numbers is a declared purpose raises 
the specter of consequences compromising integ- 
rity. This concern is reflected elsewhere, as in the 
1996 debate over the Enola Gay exhibit at the U.S. 
Smithsonian Institution, where curators modified 
an exhibit to appease veteran groups following pro- 
tests (Boyd, 1999). 
These examples were taken up and debated in 
the division as representing the dilemmas with 
which they were faced. The significance of these 
examples, however, was not prompted solely by a 
concern for preserving the past or portraying au- 
thentic history, but was seen as going to the heart of 
the function and relevance of museums. Our infor- 
mants were acutely aware that what is presented as 
authentic history has important implications for 
contemporary politics. Although ostensibly telling 
of the past, history inevitably provides stories of 
the present, and it has implications for the type of 
stories that might become facilitated in contempo- 
rary political debate. 
Informants intuitively recognized the dangers of 
instrumental rationality subverting substantive ra- 
tionality, as illustrated, in a 1996 interview, by a 
division manager's joke made in response to the 
question as to whether there were any limits on 
what museums and historic sites might do in order 
to generate money: 
This content downloaded from 129.215.49.74 on Thu, 27 Nov 2014 10:05:40 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2002 Townley 175 
Q: But certain ideas for generating money, for exam- 
ple, are not OK? 
A: I can't think of a one. 
Q: What are the limits? 
A: If somebody was going to run a brothel, I'd say 
that I wanted to know about that ahead of time. 
Humor is often a way of capturing ambiguity and 
paradox in an organization (Hatch & Ehrlich, 1993). 
The paradox here is of a values-based organization 
being forced to think in increasingly instrumental 
terms, leading to the increased ambiguity about 
what criteria should guide actions. 
Formal rationality was the least explicitly appar- 
ent element of institutional change. It did not have 
the immediate resonance of substantive rationality 
with agreement with the need to be accountable 
and provide value for money. Nor did it have the 
visibility of theoretical or practical rationality, as 
attempts to implement measures raised practical 
difficulties. Formal rationality remained hidden 
below the surface of organizational life. It was on 
the occasions that issues of organizational identity 
surfaced that this was really apparent; such issues 
included the design of exhibits, the development of 
a storyline, approving a particular event, deciding 
on the use of resources, restoring an artifact, or 
building or developing a revenue-generating activ- 
ity. These events raised the question "Who are 
we?" as the basis for answering the question "What 
should we do?" Business planning, with its refer- 
ence to products and markets (Oakes et al., 1998), 
and performance measures, with their emphasis on 
visitation and economic impact, had subtly oper- 
ated to destabilize a firm and unambiguous sense of 
organizational identity. The response to "who are 
we?" was no longer solely "preservers and inter- 
preters of heritage" and cognizance of the values 
inherent in this identity. Business plans and per- 
formance measures introduced the consciousness 
of also being a market operation competing for lei- 
sure dollars, second-guessing the consequences of 
decisions. The question of identity became more 
contentious, leading many to see a compromising 
of heritage and education in favor of entertainment. 
This destabilization was not solely the impact of 
the rationalized myth of the strategic performance 
measurement system but was also a response to the 
practical need to raise money as budgets were dras- 
tically cut. Strategic performance measurement, 
however, legitimated decisions in terms of increas- 
ing visitation or economic impact, thus valorizing 
some decisions over others. Formal rationality in- 
troduced a subtle, "slippery slope" element to or- 
ganizational decision making, the consequences of 
which were only apparent over the longer term. 
DISCUSSION 
This study illustrates responses to competing 
and inconsistent logics brought about by a clash of 
value spheres between the cultural and the eco- 
nomic. Business planning and performance mea- 
sures introduced a different form of rationality to 
the substantive and practical rationality of museum 
staffs. Given the competing legitimacies, it is not 
surprising that there was ambivalence in responses 
to changes. 
The responses reveal something of the complex- 
ity of strategic responses to institutional pressures 
(Oliver, 1991) and the contextual richness of how 
agents respond to institutionalized myths (Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997). Formally, there was acquies- 
cence or compliance with the requests to introduce 
a strategic performance measurement system. This 
took the form of conscious obedience rather than 
incorporation of the norms of the institutional re- 
quirements. Although the planning exercise was of 
some use in clarifying organizational goals, perfor- 
mance measures were rejected as being valuable in 
evaluating the outcomes of the organizations. Al- 
though there was public compliance, privately in- 
dividuals challenged, attacked, and dismissed the 
value of business plans and performance measures. 
The current evidence of this activity is in keeping 
with other research that has shown that coercive 
pressure results in procedural compliance, a me- 
chanical process of implementation focusing on 
external needs and requirements, to ensure legiti- 
macy, but a lack of embeddedness, as performance 
measures fail to become part of operation manage- 
ment (McKevitt & Lawton, 1996). Although there 
was compliance or acquiescence with coercive iso- 
morphism, there was resistance to mimetic isomor- 
phism: the private sector model was explicitly re- 
jected. 
Of the five criteria Oliver (1991) identified as 
influencing positions adopted on institutional 
pressures, by far the most important is content. The 
"causes" of the introduction of these measures, the 
appeal to efficiency, and hence the legitimacy of 
government, were not questioned, nor was the le- 
gitimacy of the government in making these 
changes. The degree of control the central govern- 
ment exerted and the general uncertainty of the 
rapidly changing environment also influenced con- 
formity. Cultural Facilities and Historical Re- 
sources was not institutionally placed to engage in 
the more aggressive responses of defiance or ma- 
nipulation. Limited attempts at protecting or de- 
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coupling internal work activities from formal struc- 
tures, although initially successful, were inhibited 
as business planning and performance measures 
had to be introduced at the increasingly lower unit 
levels of the division and the sites, and eventually 
at the individual level. 
Identifying dimensions of rationality helps clar- 
ify the discrepancy between institutional factors 
(cause, constituents, control, and context [Oliver, 
19911), that influence compliance, and content that 
militates against compliance. CFHR and the strate- 
gic performance measurement system clashed on 
several dimensions of rationality, some of which 
were accepted by CFHR, some of which were re- 
jected. Identifying dimensions of rationality disen- 
tangles the elements of rationalized myths, show- 
ing that they are not one-dimensional, but operate 
on several levels. These different levels prompt a 
range of responses in organizational actors. The 
four dimensions of rationality are apparent in both 
value spheres and practices, although differently 
weighted and with different meanings. The interplay 
between these dimensions provides the dynamic of 
institutional change. It also helps clarify what be- 
comes institutionalized and how rationalized myths 
contribute to organizational homogenization and cre- 
ate resistance to change. 
The identification of theoretical rationality illus- 
trates how knowledge systems provide an impor- 
tant part of a rationalizing environment. Business 
plans and performance measures carry homogeni- 
zation through scientific, technical, and adminis- 
trative rationalization, a theoretical rationality. The 
development and specification of abstract catego- 
ries, the simplification of phenomena, and the for- 
mulation of patterned relations produces simpli- 
fied and generalized structures that are easily 
transportable and durable across time and space 
(Latour, 1987). It is this degree of codification that 
facilitates the diffusion and dissemination of a stra- 
tegic performance measurement system across dif- 
ferent domains and the system's replicability. In 
doing so, codification "produces a great expansion, 
almost everywhere, of management. It also stan- 
dardizes this management across sectors and coun- 
tries" (Meyer, 1994: 53). 
Business plans and performance measures also 
carry homogenization through economic rational- 
ization-the formal rationality of a means-end cal- 
culation. Performance measures emphasize ends or 
consequences. The defining characteristic of formal 
rationality is that it is assessed in relation to as- 
sumed or calculated consequences, or the actions 
of others. Within this framework, individuals are 
induced to act on the conscious reflection of the 
probable consequences of action; expectations are 
used as a means for inducing the calculation of 
ends. Because of this, formal rationality can con- 
flict with the substantive and practical rationality 
of a value sphere. 
Distinguishing between the two forms of ratio- 
nality-that is, distinguishing means-end relation- 
ships where there is a statement of causal attribu- 
tion (theoretical rationality) from means-end 
relationships that involve calculation of results and 
manipulation of effects (formal rationality)-is im- 
portant. The two forms have different implications 
and effects. Theoretical rationalization is the prod- 
uct of scientific analysis. However, as Meyer noted, 
the sciences "tell constituent actors about the na- 
ture of the world"; [they] "do not principally pro- 
duce self-interested purposive action" (1994: 54). 
The formal rationality of performance measures in- 
stills the latter. 
Differentiating between theoretical and formal 
rationality also allows identifying different aspects 
of resistance. Within CFHR, there was simulta- 
neous resistance to both dimensions of rationality, 
taking different forms. Theoretical rationalization 
was rejected as being too linear and failing to ad- 
dress the concerns of practicing managers. As Mintz- 
berg (1994: 54) noted, the world does not come 
partitioned into arbitrary categories. Theoretical ra- 
tionality, when faced with concrete practices of 
organizational life, provoked resistance and indi- 
cated some of its potential limits, as rational mod- 
els came up against practical effects. 
Theoretical rationalization was seen as irrelevant 
in terms of its not answering the questions of mu- 
seum staff, as not being feasible, and as adding to 
bureaucracy; formal rationality raised moral ques- 
tions, as cultural accounts of museums were in 
danger of being overtaken by formalized aspects of 
visitation and by economic impact. Formal ratio- 
nalization prompted moral indignation. It placed 
an emphasis on consequences that were seen as 
having the potential for undermining the substan- 
tive rationality of the museums. Formal rationality 
surfaced important questions of values, as means- 
end calculations threatened to substitute for sub- 
stantive or value-based criteria, and the assumed 
cultural significance of museums was undermined. 
It is in this way that a logic of appropriateness 
becomes threatened by a logic of instrumentalism 
(March, 1981). 
However, in practice, theoretical and formally 
rational elements are intertwined. Formal rational- 
ization is implicated by theoretical rationaliza- 
tion-performance measures are the outcome of a 
particular template for managing. This intermesh- 
ing has implications for the strategies of resistance 
that can be mounted. Although the epistemological 
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underpinning of theoretical rationality may be 
questioned, the dominant logic of formal rational- 
ity may still persist. How these dimensions of ra- 
tionalization are played out in relation to the sub- 
stantive and practical rationality of CFHR is part of 
an ongoing dynamic that unfolds over time. Trac- 
ing this interplay is the role of longitudinal case 
analysis. 
Identifying different dimensions of rationality 
within rationalized myths also allows for a poten- 
tial hierarchy of myths to be discerned as well as a 
provisional ordering of which elements of myths 
prompt greater accommodation and resistance. 
Generally, where substantive rationality appeals to 
broadly institutionalized values, there is little re- 
sistance. The latter arises over attempts to specify 
what is meant in practice by broad value statements 
and is fought over issues of theoretical and practi- 
cal rationality. A deeper underlying tendency, 
however, is for formal rationality to undermine 
substantive rationalities, an incipient instrumental 
rationalization that was recognized in Weber's ra- 
tionalization thesis. 
Weber noted that wherever value-rational actions 
are weakened as a consequence of the general up- 
rooting of substantive rationalities, purely means- 
end rational action permeates organizations more 
easily (Brubaker, 1984). In March's (1981) terms, 
the logic of appropriateness fails to set limits on 
instrumental behavior. This is because reasoning 
that matches means efficiently to ends can be exer- 
cised apart from membership of a tradition or prac- 
tice. It is a rationality that requires no particular 
type of social setting. In MacIntyre's (1984) terms, it 
proffers the repudiation of a tradition in the name 
of abstract universal principles. And, as Meyer 
noted, it also offers a process whereby "one can 
discuss ... organization without much mentioning 
the actual substantive activities the organization 
will do. ... An older world in which schools were 
managed by educators, hospitals by doctors ... 
[museums by - curators] ... now receded into 
quaintness. All these things are now seen as organ- 
izations, a world wide discourse instructs on the 
conduct of organization" (Meyer, 1994: 53). 
Reference to substantive and practical reason 
echoes the distinction made in the neoinstitutional 
literature between rational and practical action and 
allows it to be more clearly drawn (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). A practice, and the prac- 
tical reason that sustains it, illustrates the role of 
social and moral obligation that informs behavior 
in a sphere. It also explains how "normative obli- 
gations . . . enter into social life primarily as fact" 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 14). Pragmatic, day-to- 
day actions- DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) practi- 
cal, semiautomatic, and noncalculative practical 
reasons-are value-based, taken-for-granted practi- 
cal activities. Substantive and practical rationality 
provides the structure of morality that sustains the 
basic framework for understanding action. It is this 
framework that is disrupted by the theoretical and 
formal dimensions of business planning and per- 
formance measures. It also amplifies what Mintz- 
berg meant when he stated "anyone can put a num- 
ber against anything they care to on a piece of 
paper" and warned that this "can do terrible injus- 
tice in practice to the complex set of values con- 
tained in the human system called organization" 
(Mintzberg, 1994: 54). 
Paying greater attention to the dimensions of ra- 
tionality identified by Weber offers some prospects 
of reconciling the old and the new institutional- 
isms. The point has been made that the role of 
values was central to the old institutionalism. 
Neoinstitutionalism, however, has taken a more 
cognitive turn (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 
1995). The concepts of substantive rationality and 
of practical reason informed by social and moral 
obligations are possible routes to incorporating the 
concept of values. In addition, an analysis in terms 
of rationality may help facilitate analyses in which 
the stability of organizational arrangements and in- 
ertia, as well as change and conflict, are recognized. 
Finally, dimensions of rationality may also facili- 
tate an analysis of identities. As Selznick (1949) 
identified, by adopting a distinctive set of values, 
an organization acquires an identity, and when 
these structures are put into question, maintaining 
an identity becomes a struggle to preserve a unique 
set of values. This dynamic operates at the individ- 
ual level as well, as March's (1981) depiction of the 
logic of appropriateness, with its question "What 
kind of person am I?" identifies. Patterns of formal 
organizing and practices inform not only action, 
but also actors (Scott & Meyer, 1994). The impact of 
changes in rationality on organizational and indi- 
vidual identities is not a feature that has dominated 
institutional theory, but it is an important dimen- 
sion that deserves more attention. 
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